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STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR APPEAL 
Section 9, Article 8 of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Appellant's reply brief to respondent's brief on appeal and 
the appellant's brief in response to respondent's cross-appeal are 
both contained herein. 
In both briefs, appellant has directed her argument to the 
issues outlined by the respondent. Therefore, there is no new 
statement of the issues with regard to the appellant's appeal, 
other than those contained in her original appellant's brief. 
The respondent's cross-appeal is so short so as to make a 
reframing of issues unnecessary. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Third District 
Court, Judge Scott Daniels, on a petition to modify a decree of 
divorce, argued March 5th-6th, 1985. The appellant, custodial 
parent, Carol Blackburn (Moyes), asks this court to reverse the 
lower court's decision to deny her a judgment for arrearages in 
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child support. 
The respondent subsequently petitioned the lower court to 
reduce his child support obligation. He cross-appeals the lower 
court's decision, claiming the lower court did not reduce his child 
support obligation enough. The respondent requests that the court 
further reduce his child support obligation, or remand the matter 
for the same purpose. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASES 
The two briefs herein contain no new statement of the 
facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
No new summary of the arguments presented herein has been 
provided. The appellant's reply brief on her appeal responds only 
to new points contained in the respondent's brief. The 
respondent's cross-appeal brief and the reply contained herein, are 
both sufficiently short as to not warrant a summary of the 
arguments contained therein. 
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ISSUE I 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW The plaintiff-respondent argues, 
under the standard of review portion of his responsive brief, 
beginning on page 9 thereof, that Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure governs the overturning of lower court findings of 
fact. With this proposition, the appellant agrees. Rule 52(a) 
provides that findings of a lower court should not be set aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous. 
The appellant does not argue that the lower court's 
findings of fact were clearly erroneous as to what happened. The 
appellant, however, does not believe that the preponderance of the 
evidence supported a finding by the court that agreements were made 
between the parties to forgive a child support obligation. 
Appellant simply argues that a more reasonable conclusion to have 
come to, considering all of the testimony, would have been to 
conclude that the appellant acquiesced in the face of her former 
husband's aggressive insistence on terms and conditions of her 
being able to leave the State of Colorado. The wealth of detail in 
the respondent's testimony concerning all of the things he said and 
all of his plans, thoughts and assumptions, does not effectively 
negate the appellant's simple statements that she never made an 
"agreement" to reduce child support with the respondent. Appellant 
requests of the court that they consider the possibility that 
acquiesence is a more reasonable interpretation of the testimony 
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and is more consistent with that testimony than an interpretation 
which requires one to believe that the appellant simply perjured 
herself. The appellant, however, does not argue that the courts 
finding was clearly erroneous. 
What the appellant argues is that the application of the 
law to the facts by the lower court was in error. This is recited 
and argued in appellant's brief, beginning on page 14. The courts 
findings, as they apply the law to the facts, are internally 
inconsistent and incongruent. The court below was apparently 
confused as to what point in time is used as a reference point in 
determining what is future child support and what is arrearage. 
Both of the agreements Judge Daniels found were made, were as to 
then future child support. They were only arrearages with respect 
to the trial date. When the lower court stated in its finding 
numbered 3: "...defendant does not have the power to waive future 
payments from this time forward, in that they are not her to waive. 
They belong to the children." The court failed to recognize that 
the mother-appellant was in the same position at the time of the 
"agreement" to waive then future payments. 
B. The respondent argues, commencing on page 10 of his 
brief that, in fact, a person may be estopped to collect 
reimbursement for child support arrearages. With this simple 
proposition, the appellant also agrees. Appellant, in her own 
brief, argues that estoppel as a defense for the non-payment of 
child support should exist, but only in limited circumstances. 
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Those limited circumstances should be those where the purported 
acts upon which the obligor relied were: 1) not an agreement; and 
2) especially not an agreement to forgive then future child support 
payments. 
In this case, both of the alleged agreements were to 
forgive a then future child support obligation. Neither was to 
forgive a then arrearage. Appellant's position is that the 
doctrine of estoppel is a defense which is alive and well and 
available to a child support obligor, but only as to back child 
support obligations which, at the time of the alleged agreement, 
were then arrearages. The case law is clear that the parties are 
incapable of making an agreement, either oral or in writing, to 
forgive then future child support without prior approval of the 
court. 
Respondent contends that appellant made an agreement in the 
fall of 1979 to reduce child support from $400.00 per month to 
$120.00 per month, and to allow the respondent, from that time 
forward, to no longer pay $320.00 of the court ordered $440.00 
child support. This $320.00 per month had been previously paid by 
respondent in the form of a house payment. Such an agreement, if 
looked at then, was then as to future payments due. It was not in 
writing and was not approved by the court. It, therefore, violated 
public policy because it was prohibited by common law, and was 
void, ab initio. Our courts have ruled these agreements are void 
and of no effect. The question is not whether there was an 
arrearage at the time of trial. There clearly was. The only 
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question is as to whether or not the "agreement" allegedly made was 
as to then arrearage or future payments. 
Similarly, respondent alleges that later, in Provo, Utah, 
the parties entered into a written agreement memorializing their 
earlier agreement, entitled Revised Child Support Agreement. 
Again, this agreement was then as to future support. Said document 
does not even purport to contain a written agreement between the 
parties to forgive what were then arrearages, but was a document to 
be controlling in the future. It was not approved by the court, 
the court was eliminated from the review process as to that change 
in the terms of the decree. The question, again, is not whether 
those amounts were arrearages at the time of trial in March, 1985, 
but whether the agreement was as to then future child support to 
become due. If the "agreement" was as to then future payments, the 
"agreement" is and was void for failure to be approved by the 
court. Therefore, no estoppel defense is available to the 
respondent on these facts. 
C. There is no dispute between the parties concerning 
what the elements of estoppel in a child support case are. There 
are four: a) affirmative acts; b) reasonable reliance; c) 
change in position; and d) to ones detriment. 
The appellant testified that she had conversations with the 
respondent in which he requested concessions from her in connection 
with her decision to sell the Colorado home and move to Provo, 
Utah. She further testified that over a period of years, she came 
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to expect that she could not get more money out of her former 
husband than he said he would pay her. The appellant testified 
that she never agreed to any of the reductions or demands that the 
respondent made, and her testimony to that effect was clear and 
unequivocal. The respondent stated his position to the appellant 
many times. She was not in the mood to fight with him. The 
respondent believed that his position was just, the appellant did 
not believe she would convince him to the contrary by fighting him. 
Although she did not agree, she avoided him and did nothing. The 
respondent, based upon his misunderstanding of the law, and his 
selfish views of fairness, came to believe that she had made an 
agreement when, in fact, she had not. 
Similarly, the appellant later, after she had left and 
moved to Provo, Utah, signed a document which stated that the 
respondent would 
"...continue to pay Carol $120.00 for child support, with 
an added inflation adjustment as follows: in January of 
each year, the monthly payment will increase by $10, ie, 
beginning January, 1981, monthly payments will be $130; 
beginning January 1982, monthly payments will be $140, 
etc..." Revised Child Support Agreement, 11-13-80 
Although his agreement is referred to as a memorial of the earlier 
agreement it, in fact, does not refer to any earlier agreement. It 
simply is a written document which purports to forgive, in advance, 
what were then future child support payments. This agreement was 
never approved by the court. 
Again, the appellant testified that she signed this 
document because she believe that it was all she would get from the 
respondent, regardless of her efforts or protestations to the 
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contrary. She saw it as an opportunity to lock in some increases. 
Appellant's further testimony was the she did not understand this 
document to be a "giving up" of the $320.00 per month previously 
ordered by the Colorado court as child support, but paid in the 
form of a house payment, because it made no reference to that 
provision of the decree. 
Appellant has never disagreed with or denied that she wrote 
letters requesting payment from the respondent of $120.00, or any 
other lesser amount as child support. What the appellant denies is 
that she ever agreed to give up her court ordered child support. 
The testimony of the appellant was that she had no hope of getting 
more out of her former husband than he had decided he would pay, 
and that to engage him in argument or litigation would bring her 
more frustration than money. Arguments by respondent that the 
appellant has admitted such an agreement, because she wrote letters 
in which she asked for amounts of money which were less than the 
child support ordered, are self serving. These letters were 
written after the appellant had been bullied into believing she 
should not and, therefore, would not get more. 
D. Respondent argues on page 14 of his brief that the 
appellant, by her conduct and representations, prevented the 
respondent from taking their agreement in before the courts. When 
respondent asked at trial on cross examination what appellant had 
done to prevent him from taking the agreement before the courts, 
respondent replied that she had said that "...she did not want to 
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go back to court because she was in a hurry to sell the house, 
move, and enroll in September classes..." (at BYU). Respondent 
fails to bring to the attention of the court, in claiming he was 
prevented from going to court, that: 1) He did not need the 
cooperation of his former wife to go back to court. He could have 
filed a petition for modification and had his former wife served. 
He did not do this; and 2) The respondent would have had to 
explain to a Colorado court why it was fair to amend the decree of 
divorce to eliminate three quarters of the child support payment, 
simply because the plaintiff wanted to move from Colorado and 
attend school in Utah. 
Appellant believes that respondent would have had a 
difficult time convincing the Colorado court, or any court, that 
appellant was obligated to stay in the home of the parties so that 
he could continue to enjoy a tax write off he had assumed was his, 
and which had little or no value. Similarly, appellant believes 
respondent would have had a hard time convincing the Colorado court 
that appellant was supposed to take her one-half of the equity in 
the house as child support and let the respondent get his one-half 
of the equity as his return on the investment. The argument that 
the appellant did anything to keep the respondent from taking his 
alleged agreement before the courts is without merit. 
E. Again, on page 14, respondent argues that the 
appellant had a duty to speak up and object to the support checks 
which she received and endorsed. Respondent implies that if she 
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was not willing to accept the checks for $120.00 he was sending as 
payment in full, that she should have refused them. Respondent 
apparently believes that some type of accord and satisfaction was 
taking place, and that appellant should be estopped on the basis 
that by taking respondent's $120.00 per month payments she has 
waived her right to collect the amounts respondent did not pay at a 
later time. This is like the respondents argument that by talking 
about lower amounts in letters, the appellant had given her child 
support up. 
This is why public policy, along with precedent, has 
resulted in Supreme Court decisions which require agreements to 
reduce child support prospectively be approved by court order. It 
is simply too easy for child support obligors to bully former wives 
into prospective reductions in child support. The instant case is 
a prime example. 
Respondent argues that the appellant "intentionally 
acquiesced in the support amount of $120.00, because she had 
$13,000.00 in her pocket." Of course she did. One of the best 
opportunities for a former husband to bully a woman into acceptance 
or toleration of a reduction in the court ordered child support, is 
to press her at a time when she has some money and feels that she 
can get along without all of the ordered support. Respondent fails 
to point out that the $13,000.00 which the appellant had came from 
her one-half of the equity from the sale of the parties former 
home, and that respondent also received $13,000.00 for his one-
half. 
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On page 15 of respondent's reply brief, he argues that it 
was reasonable for him to rely on the defendant's actions and to 
change his position because of them. The appellant's actions were 
that she had obtained a divorce from the respondent, she was 
awarded $440.00 per month as child support, $120.00 of which was 
paid directly to her and $320.00 of which was paid in the form of a 
house payment. Appellant indicated that she wanted to leave the 
state, go to BYU, and take the children with her. Respondent 
immediately told her that it was unfair for her to leave Colorado, 
and that he would lose tax advantages he had claimed on the home 
through claiming the interest paid on the home loan and the 
depreciation thereof. According to respondent, the appellant, in 
not jumping up and slapping him in the face and saying "No!", 
induced him, mislead him and caused him to reasonably rely on their 
"agreement". 
Appellant now wishes that she had aggressively pursued 
going back to court at the time. Only then would she have realized 
that she did not have to "put up with" the imposition of such 
unfair terms in order to sell the house, get her equity, and leave 
the state. What the respondent relied on was his ability to bully 
his former wife into unfair terms. The terms were unreasonable. 
His reliance, if any, was unreasonable. 
It is very important at this juncture to explain the 
difference between the language in the separation agreement 
documents which the parties signed prior to their divorce (which 
was the basis for the divorce), and the decree of divorce document. 
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The separation agreement which the parties signed prior to the 
decree of divorce, (Appendix "A") had a provision which stated in 
paragraph 12 thereof, that "No modification or waiver of any of the 
terms of this agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed 
by both parties." This provision clearly stated that the parties 
could, at any time, and by written agreement, amend that separation 
agreement. It was not intended to be a provision allowing the 
parties to amend the decree of divorce, or any other document. No 
language granting the parties any such power exists in the decree 
of divorce. Respondent argues that because of the language in the 
separation agreement, the parties obtained the power to modify, by 
themselves, in writing, any portion of the decree of divorce 
subsequently entered. 
It is not possible for parties, by private agreement, to 
eliminate the state, through the courts as a supervisor, overseer 
and protector of the children's rights. The parties could not 
then, and cannot now, by agreement, eliminate the requirement that 
agreements for the reduction of prospective child support be 
approved by the court. Public policy and Utah case law are clearly 
to the contrary. 
Again, at the bottom of page 15 of his brief, respondent 
argues that a reasonable person would have believed that they could 
rely on the terms of the revised child support agreement entered 
into between the parties and had the authority to make written 
revisions of the separation agreement. Even if the status of the 
law were that parties could amend their decrees of divorce by 
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private agreement with regard to child support, it would not be 
reasonable for the respondent to believe that he could rely on the 
enforcement of such unfair terms. A reasonable person could not 
assume that his former wife could be forced to: 
1. Stay in the home, giving up her right to move from it 
at will; 
2. Not be able to sell and get her equity from the home, 
without making a concession of the loss of three quarters of her 
child support; 
3. Give up child support as a penalty in order to obtain 
the freedom to move; and 
4. Shift the burden of child support from the respondent 
to the appellant's mother, as a condition of allowing her to move 
and receive her equity in the home. 
Again, if the parties had gone back to court at the time, 
this would have become abundantly clear to the respondent. 
At the bottom of page 15 and the top of page 16 of 
respondent's brief, he argues that "Finally, a reasonable person 
would have believed his children, on the sum of $120.00 per month, 
were adequately supported, because the appellant had $13,000.00 in 
her pocket." The respondent had been ordered to pay the appellant 
$440.00 per month in child support. Provisions had been made that 
$320.00 of that child support obligation could be paid in the form 
of the payment on the home, the use and possession of which had 
been awarded to the appellant and the children. Respondent's 
argument suggests that the appellant should pay some penalty for 
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her choice to relocate. 
Respondent argues on page 16 of the reply brief that he 
lost his visitation because of his reasonable reliance on the acts 
of the appellant. He did not. Appellant had freedom under the 
Constitution of the United States to move freely among the United 
States, and outside this country's boarders to travel and relocate 
at will. She made her desires known to the respondent. Her 
intentions were clear and unequivocal. The appellant was, and is, 
a fit mother. With this the respondent has agreed. Respondent 
made no claim that custody of the children should be changed in 
connection with appellant's leaving the state. His visitation 
rights remained the same. Increase in the difficulty of visiting 
was an unavoidable side effect of relocation. 
If the respondent's argument is that a reduction in child 
support was reasonable because he was not going to be able to see 
his children as much, then he mistakenly believes that the payment 
of child support buys opportunity for visitation. If respondent 
was bartering visitation against child support, it was 
inappropriate. Visitation is not an appropriate estopple issue. 
Respondent further argues that, by relying on his 
"agreement" with the appellant, he gave up a piece of property in 
which he was building equity. Again, this argument is without 
merit. Both parties were building equity in the home during the 
year between the time of the divorce and the time of its sale. 
Both parties lost the benefit of that investment upon the sale of 
the home, but respondent agreed to the sale and to the sale price. 
16 
Both parties received more than $13,000.00 as their share of the 
equity from that sale. Each of the parties was free to reinvest at 
any rate of return they could acquire. The respondent did not ask 
to cash out appellant's interest and retain the home as an 
investment, but rather, was satisfied to sell the home and get the 
equity. The argument that respondent should have been allowed to 
impose upon the appellant a reduction in child support to 
compensate him for the loss of his investment is an unreasonable 
argument. 
Respondent argues that he gave up a $408.00 per month 
benefit when the home was sold. Appellant does not argue that the 
house payment was not $408.00 per month. The tax benefit, however, 
is not $408.00. The deduction may have been close to $408.00 per 
month if the payment was in the early part of the loan. However, 
the benefit of such a deduction, depending on the income of the 
parties would have been less than one-third of that, in terms of 
tax dollars saved. Respondent argues as though deductions are the 
equivalent of tax credits. 
A fatal flaw in the reasoning of the respondent with regard 
to his tax benefits argument, is simply that during the year 
following divorce, respondent made approximately $20,000.00. But 
for the next four or five years he had no taxable income. A tax 
deduction would have been of no benefit to him anyway. 
At the top of page 17, respondent argues the fourth element 
of estoppel, i.e., the showing of actual detriment. Respondent 
claims that he relied to his detriment such that it would be 
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unreasonable now to go back and enter a judgment against him for 
arrearages. In the material on page 17 of respondent's brief, not 
a single change in position for the worse is articulated. There is 
a reference to the injuries outlined in the third element on page 
16 of the brief. The respondent did not lose visitation rights. 
His visitation became for difficult for him to exercise. This is 
not a loss which makes it unfair to grant a judgment for arrearages 
in child support. 
If he had put the monies he had saved in child support, 
after bullying his former wife into not expecting it anymore, into 
an interest bearing account, he could pay it now, and actually have 
benefited by not paying. There is no showing that he experienced 
financial detriment because his wife left the State of Colorado. 
Respondent did give up his investment in the home, but at the same 
time, cashed out his investment, receiving its equivalent in cash. 
If he chose to not reinvest that money, or did not reinvest it as 
well, that was his own choosing. There was no showing that he lost 
money because he was cashed out of the home. Under these facts, 
the respondent has improved his position by not having paid child 
support. 
The final argument of the respondent in reply to the brief 
of the appellant commences on page 17 of his brief, and continues 
over to page 18. It this argument, he claims that in Larsen, 300 
P.2d 596 (Utah, 1956), the court approved estoppel as a defense 
when the parties had made an agreement to what was then, in time, 
going to be future child support payments. Such an interpretation 
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of Larsen flies directly in the face of the cases cited by 
appellant in her brief, and in which the courts have stated that 
future child support cannot be bargained away, and the cases which 
required that any attempt to affect the future child support 
obligation of a child support obligor must not only be in writing, 
but previously approved by the court. 
Respondent further argues at the bottom of page 19 of his 
brief, that: 
"The trial court did not give the revised child support 
agreement document... subsequent to Carol Moyes leaving 
Denver, prospective or future application." 
The court's published findings of fact and conclusions of law did 
estop the appellant from collecting what was then future support. 
The court stated that: 
"The evidence was clear that the from the testimony 
presented from the modification agreement that the 
intention was that she would only collect $120.00 per 
month. He would allow her to sell the house. He relied 
on that. And I think she was estopped from collecting 
back child support. However, I do not think estoppel 
applies to future payments...you can't waive future 
payments, really. They are not her rights to waive. 
They belong to the children." 
The court below did, in fact, give the revised child support 
agreement of the parties future and prospective application with 
regard to child support to be owing from November 13th, 1980 (the 
date of the agreement, Appendix "C") forward. Those monies only 
became arrearages with respect to the time of trial. That Revised 
Child Support Agreement made no mention of forgiving a then 
arrearage. When the appellant went to court before Judge Daniels 
on March of 1985, her claim was simply that the parties could not 
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have, at the time in question, made a deal to barter away what was 
then prospectively owed. Similarly, the oral "agreement" in the 
fall of 1979 was as to future payments and no estoppel defense can 
arise. Therefore, it was not bartered away, and there were, at the 
time of trial, legitimately due and owing arrearages. 
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON RESPONDENT'S CROSS-APPEAL 
ISSUE II 
LOWER COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW STATUTORY FACTORS 
REQUIRED TO SUPPORT DOLLAR CALCULATIONS 
Respondent has cross-appealed in this matter. Respondent 
appeals the outcome of trial on his subsequent petition for 
modification which was tried on the 31st day of January, 1986, and 
which was completed on the 13th day of February, 1986. In 
respondents cross-appeal, he argues that in reducing his support 
obligation to the appellant, the court did not comply with Section 
78-45-7(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which sets forth 
seven factors the court must consider in petitions for modification 
for a reduction in child support. 
Appellant has difficulty in answering the cross-appeal of 
the respondent. This is because respondent has not had the 
proceedings of the modification trial from which he appeals 
transcribed. 
Appellant agrees that there are statutory elements which 
should have been considered by the court. The appellant does, 
however, disagree with the respondent concerning error on the part 
of the court. Respondent argues on page 19 of his brief, that: 
"The court heard evidence from the respondent as to his 
income and ability to earn. No evidence was presented on 
the other factors of support.11 
There is no transcript before this court to indicate what evidence 
was presented and what was not. There being no transcript offered 
by respondent on cross-appeal, he can not document what evidence 
21 
was or was not presented at trial. 
The respondent herein was the petitioner. The respondent 
was the one who alleged that there had been a change of 
circumstances which warranted a reconsideration of his child 
support obligation. It was the petitioner-respondent, Mr. 
Blackburn, who had the burden of both moving forward with the case, 
and of persuasion. The matter was tried to the court. If no 
evidence was presented on the other five factors bearing on the 
modification issue as claimed by respondent, then the respondent 
failed to meet his burden. 
Considerable testimony and evidence was introduced at the 
time of trial concerning the actual income of the obligor, the 
respondent, and his ability to earn. A substantial amount of 
testimony established the fact that the respondent, subsequent to 
the sale of the home in Colorado, quit his job because he did not 
like the "hassle and pressure" associated with it. The evidence 
further showed that the respondent lived on the $13,000.00 equity 
his received out of the sale of the home, and by his own choice, 
experienced self-imposed poverty. 
When asked what he did with all of his time during those 
many months (years) he was unemployed between the 1980 revised 
child support agreement and the trial date (1986), the respondent's 
only answer was that he "read books". 
The failure of the respondent in this matter to have 
presented evidence on five of the seven elements outlined by 
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statute as being relevant, was the respondent's own fault. 
Respondent cannot now argue that the court failed to consider the 
five issues on which the respondent presented no evidence. 
The revised child support agreement which respondent urges 
should have been adopted by the court as evidence and a guideline 
on the issues of the needs of the children, was, at the time of 
hearing, more than five years old, and was never offered to the 
court as evidence of the needs of the children. The respondent had 
no duty of support to any other children or person. 
Appellant was home with young children under the age of 
five years, and unable to work. Her husband, Jack Moyes, was 
unemployed as of the time of trial. All of these factors led the 
court to conclude as it did in the matter, as follows: 
"1. The court finds that there has been a 
material change of circumstances which has occurred since 
the decree of divorce was entered in this matter, in that 
the plaintiff is not now employed, whereas, he was 
employed at the time the decree of divorce was entered in 
Colorado. 
2. The court finds that the plaintiff has 
sufficient earning capacity to pay $165.00 per child, per 
month, as child support for a total child support 
obligation of $330.00 per month..." 
These findings show that the court understood that the 
plaintiff was unemployed at the time. They also show that the 
basis for a reduction in child support was a loss of income. The 
findings also show, however, that the court felt the preponderance 
of the credible evidence showed the respondent to have sufficient 
earning capacity to pay the reduced amount of $165.00 per child, 
for a total of $330.00 per month. 
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With no transcript, respondent cannot demonstrate that 
these findings are clearly erroneous as outlined in Rule 52a, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Again, it was respondents burden to put on all of the 
evidence he wanted considered at a trial on a reduction of his 
child support. If the court had insufficient evidence, respondent 
failed to meet his burden. 
It is the respondents burden to demonstrate to this court 
on appeal that the lower court made clearly erroneous findings. 
This would require reference to a record of the proceedings, so 
that this court could see the clear error. The respondent has not 
provided any transcript of proceedings. 
The findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. The best 
evidence is that the lower court considered properly all evidence 
presented. 
Respondent argues, under a heading "Revised Child Support 
Agreement" on page 20 of his brief, that "The foreign decree 
permitted the parties to amend, in writing, signed by both 
parties." A review of the Colorado decree of divorce does not 
reveal any language which purports to allow the parties to amend it 
in writing, orally or in any other way. 
The remainder of the respondent's arguments, to the effect 
that the Colorado court did not need to exercise control over the 
agreements of the parties, because they had turned such control 
over to the parties, fails because the document simply does not 
provide that. Nothing in the Colorado decree suggests that it was 
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designed for the purposes of allowing future modification by the 
parties of the child support obligation, without court approval. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the court's findings are not clearly erroneous as 
to whether the parties ever entered into an oral agreement, or as 
to the intention of the parties in entering into the subsequent 
Revised Child Support Agreement, the evidence suggests that the 
situation was one of insistence by the respondent and acquiesce by 
the appellant. Although Judge Daniels did not commit clear error 
in making the findings he did, his findings as they apply the law 
to the facts, are internally inconsistent and show a 
misunderstanding as to how the doctrine of estoppel is applied. 
In determining what is prospective or future child support, 
and an agreement to reduce it, as opposed to what is an arrearage, 
and an agreement to forgive it, one must look at the respective 
obligations as of the time the alleged agreement was made. In the 
instant case, the oral agreement respondent alleges took place in 
the fall of 1979, was then as to a future child support obligation, 
not an agreement to forgive what were then arrearages. The 
subsequent Revised Child Support Agreement document signed 
approximately one year later, was again an agreement as to what 
would then have been future child support payments, not an 
agreement to forgive what would have then been arrearages. 
Although the estoppel defense may be available to the child support 
obligor who had an agreement to forgive what were, at the time the 
agreement was made, arrearages, it cannot apply to a future child 
support obligation. Any attempt to modify the terms of a decree of 
divorce as to a future child support obligation must be in writing, 
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submitted to the court, and approved in advance. 
Respondent does not claim that he has ever entered into an 
agreement with appellant to forgive unpaid child support 
arrearages. When looking back at the child support amounts at 
issue in this matter, one must realize that all amounts which 
appellant seeks to obtain were yet to be paid, and were future 
amounts at the time the alleged agreements were made. 
Appellant testified that she never agreed to a reduction in 
child support, but acquiesced when she realized that her former 
husband was not going to do more for her than he had said he would. 
Her acquiesence in the face of that, including the taking of the 
lesser amount sent her in child support and the writing of letters 
concerning it, are not the affirmative acts which constitute the 
basis of an estoppel, even if the estoppel argument were available 
to the respondent. 
It was not reasonable for the respondent to rely on the 
acquiesence of the appellant. The demands he made on her in 
connect with "letting her" sell the house and leave the state, were 
not reasonable demands. One cannot rely on the unconscionable. If 
respondent had gone to court in Colorado, as he claims he wanted 
to, but cannot explain as to why he did not, the unreasonableness 
of his expectations and reliance thereon would have become clear to 
him. No court in this state, or in Colorado, would have allowed 
the respondent to withhold child support as a penalty for selling 
the house and leaving the state. Likewise, no court would have 
forced the appellant take her share of the equity in the home as 
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pre paid child support. There was no evidence that this was ever 
agreed on or considered by the court or the parties. 
The respondent never changed position financially or 
economically because of the appellant's leaving in any way that 
hurt him. There was no evidence that he did. His children moving 
away, the selling of the home and the payment to him of his equity, 
and the loss of a tax deduction when he had no income, were not 
changes to his economic detriment. There is no hardship worked 
upon the respondent by allowing the appellant to now recover the 
child support which he should have paid. In fact, unless interest 
is awarded on the child support arrearage owed, the respondent is 
better off for not having paid it. 
It was the burden of persuasion of the respondent at the 
subsequent hearing on his petition for modification to put on 
evidence with regard to all issues he believed relevant to his 
request for a reduction in child support. If the only evidence 
before the court at the time of that hearing were as to the 
respondent's income and earning ability, and not as to the other 
five elements suggested by Section 78-45-7(2), it was because the 
petitioner, with the burden to present evidence, failed to do so. 
In fact, evidence was presented to the court to the effect that the 
appellant was unemployed, that her husband was unemployed, and that 
the respondent's unemployed status was the result of self imposed 
poverty, and that the respondent had earning capacity sufficient to 
allow him to pay the reduced amount. 
The Revised Child Support Agreement was not evidence from 
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which the court could deduce the needs of the parties children in a 
trial in 1985. There was no evidence that said agreement had 
anything to do with the needs of the children, even in 1980. 
WHEREFORE, appellant prays that the judgment of the 
Honorable Scott Daniels, subsequent to the March 5th-6th, 1985 
hearing denying appellant judgment for child support arrearages, be 
reversed, and that appellant be awarded judgment for $19,840.00 for 
arrearages arising in child support between August, 1979 and March 
1st, 1985, plus interest on said amount from March 1st, 1985 to the 
date of this courts decision, at the judgment rate of 12% per 
annum. 
Appellant further prays that this matter be remanded to the 
District Court for hearing on requests for costs of court and 
attorneys fees incurred in bringing and maintaining this appeal. 
Appellant further prays that respondents cross-appeal be 
denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ clay of February, 1988. 
^L^v^w 
David A. McPhie 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered two true and correct 
copies of Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Brief on Appeal and 
Appellant's Brief in Response to Respondent's Cross-Appeal, to 
attorney for respondent, David J. Berceau, at 39 Post Office Place, 
Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah on February «J^*S 1988. 
David A. McPhie 
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STATS J0F C0U>8AD0 
Civil Action NO. D-20328 
Division 1 
In re the Marriage of: 
CAROL JEANNE BLACKBURN, 
Petitioner, 
and 
ROBERT FARRIS, BLACKBURN, JR., 
Respondent* 
SEPARATION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, STIPULATION AND CONTRACT entered 
into this 18th day of December, 1978, by and between Carol 
Jeanne Blackburn, the Petitioner, hereinafter referred to as 
•Wife" and Robert Farris Blackburn, Jr., the Respondent, here-
inafter referred to as "Husband"; and 
WHEREAS, Petitioner and Respondent herein have instituted 
their action in the District Court in and for the County of 
Arapahoe, State of Colorado, being Civil Action No. D-20328; and 
WHEREAS, the Petitioner and Respondent have separated, 
and ara not living together as Husband and Wife; and 
WHEREAS, it is the mutual desire of the parties that 
a full and final adjustment of their property rights, interests, 
and claims be settled and determined by the parties to this 
Agreement, and that the provision be made for the custody and 
support of the unemancipated adnor children of the partiesi and 
WHEREAS, «^iOt^th4 partiei h» 
stands/th* 
'
 l
 * ~ - / % - * %? - * * ^ 
believes i * r t < m 4tp 4fc ; i* ir 
and freely and fully accepts the provisions, terms, and conditions 
thereof. 
HOH,THEREFORE, in consideration of the parties and 
the liatual covenants and agreements herein contained, receipt 
and sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged by each of the 
parties hereto, the parties mutually agree, stipulate and covenant 
as followst 
1. RELEASE 
That except as specified in this Agreement, each party 
hereto is hereby released and absolved from any and all obligations 
and liabilities for the future acts and duties of the other, and 
that each of said parties hereby releases the other from any 
and all liabilities, debts, or obligations of any kind or character 
incurred by the other, from and after this date, and from any 
and all claims, demands, including all claims of either party 
upon the other for maintenance of Wife or Husband or otherwise, 
it being understood that this instrument is intended to settle 
the rights of the parties hereto in all respects, except as 
hereinafter provided. 
2. AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY 
That any and all property acquired from and after the 
date hereof shall be the sole and separate property of the party 
acquiring the same, and each of said parties hereby respectfully 
grants to the other all such further acquisitions of property 
as the sole and separate property of the one so acquiring the same. 
3. ESTATES 
That each of said parties shall have immediate right to 
dispose of by Will, his or her respective interest in any and 
all property belonging to him or her, or hereafter acquired by 
either of the respective parties, and each of the parties hereto 
hereby waives any an* all rights to the estate of the other, 
including the right to widow's allowance, or any other rights 
* • SEPARATION 
The parties may and shall continue to live apart for 
the rest of their lives. Each shall be free from interference, 
direct or indirect, by the other as fully as though unmarried. 
Each may for his or her separate benefit, engage in any employment, 
business or profession he or she may choose. 
5. PROPERTY 
The parties make the following disposition and settlement 
with respect to their property. 
A. Real Property 
The parties are the joint owners of a residence 
located at 6518 South Dahlia Circle, Littleton, Colorado. 
That real property will remain as the joint property of the 
parties until such time in the future as they choose to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the property. 
The Husband will make the house payment as indicated 
below until such time as the house is sold. 
If the property is jointly owned at the time of 
the death of one of the parties, the deceased's interest shall 
pass to the children of the parties. The parties acknowledge 
that this Separation Agreement is not a Will. 
B. Personal Property 
1) The Wife will take as her sole property: 
a) All of the personal belongings now in 
her possession; 
b) The 1973 Volkswagen automobile; 
c] All bank accounts in her name; 
JtssMtanti 
in joint ownership with Husband; 
f) The following items of furniture and 
#ou* brown chairs — wood, rocker, and 
upholstered 
Ottoman 
Cabinet humidifier 
End table 
China cabinet 
Two twin beds 
Two desks 
Small wood bookcase 
Small magazine rack 
Three dressers 
High chair 
35mm camera 
Garden cart 
Electric lawn mower & cord 
Bar-b-q Grill 
Pioneer stereo receiver 
Garard turntable 
Two KLH speakers 
Washer 
Dryer 
Refrigerator 
White couch 
Silverwear 
Corningware dishes 
Kitchen table 6 two chairs 
Four bent wood dining room chairs 
Typing table 
All lamps except those named as Husband's 
property 
Pendulum wall clock 
Electric typewriter 
Badminton set 
Croquet set 
Volleyball fc net 
Picnic table & benches 
Picnic basket 
Christmas tree & decorations 
Girl's Schwinn bicycle 
Assorted Garden and Lawn tools 
Shop brooms 
Folding lawn chair 
Trash cans 6 cart 
Six-foot aluminum ladder 
All children's items 
Double bed 
Dresser with mirror 
Wall mirror 
Two yellow night stands 
Parsons dining room table 
Hide-a-bed couch 
End table (round) 
Director's chair 
Tall metal bookshelves 
•lack wood bookshelves 
Green bean bag chair" 
Blue Antique chair 
White antique trunk 
Two pink suitcases 
Black/white TV 
Sewing machine t cabinet 
r^Mnpt *tf»r«»o fi radio 
Wicker phone stand 
Kirby vacuum cleaner 
Guitar 
Antique Victrola 
Cedar chest 
Lennox china 
Crystal water goblets 
Instamatic camera 
Numerous books 
Numerous record albums 
Crock pot 
Pot and pan set 
Wood tennis racket & press 
Clothes hamper 
Two clock radios 
2) The Husband will take as his sole property: 
a) All of the personal belongings now in 
b) The 1967 Mercury automobile and the 1976 
his possession; 
Ford Pickup; 
c) All bank accounts in his name; 
d) All interest in insurance policies in 
his name except that the Husband will maintain life insurance 
in an amount of at least $10,000.00 on himself and shall name 
either the Wife or the children as beneficiaries. If at such time 
as that policy is cancelled by mutual agreement between the 
parties the Husband shall retain all cash value of the policy* 
e) U.S. Savings Bonds now in }oint ownership 
with the Wife, of a value of approximately $360.00; 
f) The following items of furniture and 
household goods: 
White upholstered chair 
Beige chair & couch 
U.S. map 
Electric sander 
Floor lamp 
End table 
Green swag lamp 
Metal file cabinet 
I#arge metal bookcases 
Brown cane table lamp 
Flourescent light 4 extension cord 
Two tennis racquets 
Crank ice cream maker 
Metal m m k 
Two grey/**uitcases 
Blue suitcase 
Steam iron 
Toaster 
Ironing board (yellow & white) 
GE canister vacuum 
Manual Royal typewriter 
Small B-BQ grill 
Two tool boxes 
Numerous tools 
VTM electronic instrument 
Encyclopedia Britanica 
Numerous record albums 
Binoculars 
Instamatic camera 
Trouble light 
Extension cord (50') 
Lawn chair 
Miscellaneous pots & pans 
Golf clubs 
Oscillating fan 
Pop corn popper 
Short handled flat shovel 
6. DEBTS 
There are no outstanding joint debts of the parties 
other than the home mortgage which shall be paid by the Husband 
as set forth below. 
7. CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN 
It is agreed that the Wife is a fit and proper person 
to have custody of the children and that she shall have custody 
of the minor children of the parties, subject to reasonable and 
liberal visitation rights of the Husband. 
This provision is agreed to be in the best interests 
of the children at the present time. 
8. CHILD SUPPORT 
is presently approximately f320.00 feac^.^nthV^^%a«i[iftg said 
payment directly to;Mellon Mortgage Co.# on or before the first 
of each month. This payment will include, and the Husband shaL 
be responsible for, payments on the principal, interest, all ta: 
of these payments should increase, the Husband shall pay the 
increased amounts. 
b) The Husband will pay directly to the Wife the 
sum of $120.00 on or before the 20th of each month. 
c) The Husband will pay all medical, dental, and 
necessary orthondotia bills for the children and shall maintain 
health insurance for their benefit. The Wife will pay all 
costs for necessary medicines. 
9. MAINTENANCE 
Neither party shall pay maintenance to the other. 
10. ATTORNEY FEES 
The Husband shall pay to the Wife one-half the 
attorney fees and costs incurred by the Wife in this tion. 
11. RELEASE FROM LIABILITY 
The parties hereby mutually release and agree to 
hold harmless each other from all actions, claims and obligations 
which either of them had or may have against each other by reason 
of any cause up to the date of this agreement. 
12. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
No modification or waiver of any of the terms of 
this agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by 
both parties. 
This agreement shall be governed by the laws of 
the State of Colorado. 
This agreement constitutes the entire understanding 
of the parties. There are no agreements other than those set 
forth herein. 
Each pa :ty acknowledges that he or she has read 
this agreement, has been fully informed about this agreement, 
understands this agreement, and is signing this agreement freely and 
voluntarily. 
CAROL JEANNE BLACKBURN, Petitioner 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
) SB. 
COUNTY OF ) 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this
 m day 
of , 1978, by CAROL JEANNE BLACKBURN, Petitioner. 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: 
ROBERT FARRIS BLACKBURN, JR., Respondent 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
) 88. 
COUNTY OF ) 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this day 
Of , 1978, by ROBERT FARRIS BLACKBURN, JR., 
Respondent. 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: 
THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
^COUNTY OF ARAPAHOE 
STATE OF COLORADO 
7?» , 
_ CU.tr *„.
 t 
"c/:l:,-;;l••••••.'/.VG• 
In re the Marriage of: 
CABQI^JEANNE BLACKBURN. 
Petitioner 
and 
ROBERT FARRTS BLACKRURN, JR. 
Respondent 
CIVIL ACTION NO.£r2-Q 3 -2 8 — 
DECREE 
(Dissolution of Marriage) 
Tliis matter was heard on its merits on December 18 
was represented by RENNET)? .K. STUART — 
_, 197? Petitioner 
_ , attorney of record; 
respondent * (xppoxpoixb}::xxx. txxxxxx &G££c7i)iv:'.-lyi.iv.:i\) ( 
:/£ not appear in i>er*kn^**by-ftj U.rMfry') (xppcxfcrirtjyxxxxxa 
out counsel). The Court has examined the record, heard the evidence and the r{;i!»MJJ!- <.f ruin 
and based thereon, makes the following findings: 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this action. 
2. One of the parties,.£<'rol Jeanne Blackburn . has be*'-fiat: ;: 
state, for ninety days preceding the commencement of this proceeding. 
S. The marriage between the parties is irretrievably broken. 
4. The separation agreement between the parties, #(a copy of which is attache 1 1 
hibit A and incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim) has been considered by the Oowri 
unconscionable as to support, maintenance, and property. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a deer j if.-, 
entered, and the marriage between the parties hereto is hereby dissolved. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall perform the respective pro\ ;.„;• i 
ration agreement, attach H liercto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein as if set fv>;-;h \ 
apply to each of them.t 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the custody of the minor child r c n , Dh<' Y . if:.: 
BLACKBURN and GINA LORRAINE BLACKBURN be granted to the XeL *! i ( ,J -
* l l l C : -
AND IT IS FURTHER OIJ) KM), ADJUDGED, AND DECREED by the G 
t h e Respondent s h a l l pay a t l e a s t $ 4 4 0 . 0 0 por nc 
s u p p o r t f o r t h e n i n o r c h i l d r e n . 
_ IT 13 FURTHER CRDrRED THAT THIS COURT RETAINS SUCH JURISDICTION ul« 'ill!: 
AG\ ION AS IS PROVIDED BY I,AW. 
lUed this II day nf _ n-ccobfir. , 19 78 , at L i t t l g j o n _ 
Coloi -do. 
Approve 1^ 3 to F o r — / ? ^ ^ ^ 
Attorney for P e t i t i o n e r [A/I v> "lAz **"" ' ' '" fT^~rs 
DISTRICT JUDC.E / 
Attorney for 
REVISED CHILD SUPPORT AGREEMENT 
IT IS HEREBY AGREED between these two parties, 
Carol Seiler Blackburn and Robert Farris Blackburn, Jr., in 
regards to their divorce decree and separation agreement 
dated December 18, 1978, that the following changes be made: 
1. Robert will continue to pay Carol $120 per 
month for child support with an added inflation adjustment 
as follows: in January of each year, the monthly payment will 
increase by $10, ie, beginning January 1981, monthly payments 
will be $130; beginning January 1982, monthly payments will be 
$140, etc. 
2. Robert will pay all travel expenses of the 
children and himself associated with his reasonable and liberal 
visitation rights. 
3. Carol will take income tax deductions for the 
children so long as Robert is paying less than the IRS guide-
lines for monthly child support for qualifying exemptions. 
4. Carol will purchase medical insurance for the 
children on a group plan and Robert will reimburse Carol for 
the cost difference (if any) between single and family rates. 
5. Robert will continue to reimburse Carol for 
all the children's medical and dental bills (except orthodontia) 
Carol will continue to pay for all medicines for the children. 
November 13, 1980 
M f E 
